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CROSS-APPELLANT'S JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is vested in this Court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann, §78-2a-3(g), which authorizes appeal by right from the
final judgment of the District Court in entering its Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce, after trial of
this divorce action to the bench. The Decree was entered on March
31, 1992.

Arvilla Finlayson, the Appellant herein, timely filed

her Motion for New Trial, which was denied by written Order dated
May 20, 1992. Arvilla filed her Notice of Appeal on June 17, 1992,
and Roger Finlayson timely filed his Notice of Cross-Appeal on July
1, 1992.

iv

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
[With Citations to Standards of Review on Appeal]
BY ARVILLA'S APPEAL:
1.

Did the District Court, acting as a court of

equitable jurisdiction, abuse its discretion in ordering repayment
of the "Hallmark Note" from joint marital funds?

[Naranio v.

Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988)].
2.

Was the District Court's finding, that the vacant

lot adjacent to the marital home was not within the marital estate,
clearly erroneous?

ru«R*civ«P* 52(a); Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d

1 (Utah App. 1992)].
3.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in

awarding Arvilla only $500 in attorney's fees?

[Rasband v.

Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah App. 1988)].
4.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in

valuation and division of personal property?

[Naranio and Watson,

both supra].
5.

Were the trial proceedings conducted in a manner

that resulted in a fair trial?

[Unknown standard, as Appellant's

assignment of error is unclear to Appellee].
BY ROGER'S CROSS-APPEAL:
1.

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in

failing to order repayment of the "House Rental Note" from joint
marital funds?

[Naranjo, supra].
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ARVILLA FINLAYSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Case No. 920411-CA

Cross-Appellee,
Priority No. 16

vs.
ROGER FINLAYSON,
Defendant/Appellee,
Cross-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
AND
BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT
(Consolidated)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Roger Finlayson concurs in the "Statement of the Case"
as set forth at pages 1 and 2 of the Brief of Appellant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1962, two years prior to the parties1 marriage, Roger
Finlayson borrowed funds from his parents to open a Hallmark store
in Salt Lake City (R. 577, 578). At that time, Roger executed a
hand-written promissory note to his father for amounts borrowed
plus 6% interest, referred to as the "Hallmark Note" (R. 580). The
amount so loaned was $14,008.54 (R. 579, Finding of Fact 13, at R.
156) .

Roger testified that without the loan, he would not have

been able to open the store (R. 594) .

Roger operated the store

alone until he married Arvilla in September of 1964 (R. 436).
When the parties were married in September of 1964,
Roger's parents allowed the couple to reside in a rental unit owned
by the parents (R. 585-586).

The parties lived there for about 5%

years (R. 507, 586). While they paid no rent at that time, Roger
executed another note, payable to his father, in September 1964
(the month the parties married) , to cover rental amounts at $190
per month (R. 586-587).

Total rental amounts accrued thereunder

were $2,280 with interest at 6% (R. 589).
After their marriage, the parties began joint operation
of the Hallmark Store (R. 722), and continued to do so until the
store was sold in 1985 (R. 591-592).

Proceeds from the sale were

used to pay off the indebtedness on the marital home (R. 499, 593) ,
and for the parties' general living expenses until 1990 (R. 439).
At trial, Roger's mother Mina Finlayson, then aged
ninety-two years, testified that she recalled the circumstance of
the two Notes, and recognized those documents as being his her
husband's papers after his death in 1968 (R. 535, 561).

She

expected repayment of those obligations when it was "convenient,"
while recognizing that Roger and Arvilla were suffering financial
hardships because ". . .they had lost practically everything they
had gotten from the store."

(R. 546). Mina further testified that

the monies were loans, not gifts, repayment terms were never
specifically discussed, and that Mina had not forgiven the loans
(R. 540, 545).
2

Mina also testified that these obligations and their
repayment were the subject of conversations between Mina and
Arvilla (R. 541, 546, 729).

Arvilla herself admits that these

conversations took place, and that on one occasion Mina even stated
a

total

amount

acknowledged

of

Roger's

the

Hallmark

repayment

loan

on those

(R.

487-488).

obligations

Mina
by

four

payments in 1990, and that Mina then bought stocks for herself with
the money (R. 541-543).
As a result of the 1988 conversations between Mina and
Arvilla about the monies owed to Mina, Arvilla admits that she
began to urge Roger to repay Mina amounts owed (R. 495) .

While

Arvilla did deny that she had personal knowledge of the Rent debts
(R. 488-489) , she admitted that at one point she asked Roger "Well,
how much do WE owe your mother?"
added).

(R. 432, lines 17-18, emphasis

Arvilla testified that she began to urge Roger to repay

the debts in 1988, two years before the divorce was initiated, and
that she continued these exhortations in 1989 and 1990 (R. 496).
Kurt Finlayson, an adult son of the parties, also
testified at trial, and stated that he had heard discussions
between his parents about the debts to Mina, that he heard Arvilla
encourage repayment to Mina, and that the encouraging became more
"prevalent" after the Hallmark store was sold (R. 571) . Roger also
testified that Arvilla's requests to repay Mina were "forceful" and
"repeated" (R. 610). Just days prior to actual repayment, Roger
characterized Arvilla's demeanor as "very demanding" as to this
issue (R. 590-591)•

At this time, Roger began to get accurate
3

figures on the total amount owed, and found evidence of his
father's loan amounts (R. 579, 583).
Sometime in the 1960's, Roger's parents bought a vacant
lot next to the Roger and Arvilla's house, with the intent to build
a home on it, but the death of Roger's father changed those plans
(R. 550-551) .

At trial, Mina stated her belief that she still

owned the property, but had asked Roger to care for and sell the
lot (R. 552). Mina engaged her lawyer to take care of the details
(R. 553). The result (which, by her testimony, Mina obviously did
not understand), was an outright conveyance to Roger and Arvilla
jointly, Mina never intended to gift the property to Roger and/or
Arvilla (R. 555). On cross-examination, she stated that her intent
was not to transfer ownership, but to enable Roger to "sell it for
me" (R. 562 line 18), and ". . .if he were going to sell it, he
would have had the deed."

R. 562. At trial, Mina had no present

recall that the property had been deeded jointly to Roger and
Arvilla (R. 563).
The

testimony

of

both

corroborated these assertions.

Roger

and

Kurt

Finlayson

Kurt stated that the lot was

referred to as "grandmother's," which he took to mean Mina (R. 569570) . Kurt and Roger both testified that when an offer was made on
the lot, the two of them went to Mina's house and conveyed the
offer, which Mina personally rejected as too low (R. 570, 651) .
Roger further stated that after his father died, Mina did not say
she was "giving" the lot to Roger, that he gave nothing of value
for it, and that Mina wanted him only to maintain and sell the lot
4

for her (R.650). Roger testified that he intended only to maintain
and sell the lot for his mother (R. 650).
Factual summary of the issues of personal property,
attorney's fees, and post-trial proceedings are discussed at length
in Appellant's Brief, and in the Arguments of Appellee and CrossAppellant hereinbelow, and shall not be separately set forth at
this juncture as redundant.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARVILLA'S APPEAL:
POINT I
The

District

Court

acted

well

within

its

broad

discretion in dividing the assets and debts of the marital estate.
Arvilla has not shown any manifest inequitable result in the ruling
below, which held repayment of the "Hallmark Note" chargeable as
against joint marital assets. Arvilla's knowledge of the debt and
repeated urging of Roger to repay the debt, coupled with joint
benefit to the parties attributable to that loan, compel affirmance
of the District Court's decision.

This debt led directly to the

creation of a tangible and substantial marital asset which both
parties have enjoyed.

Set off of joint debts against marital

assets has been previously sanctioned by this Court.

Arvilla's

reliance upon the statute of limitations, estoppel and latches are
misplaced given the evidence at trial and the elements of those
defenses.

5

POINT II
The

District

Court's

finding

that

the vacant

lot

adjacent to the martial residence was not within the martial estate
is supported by overwhelming evidence in the record below.

The

trial court's finding that the transfer lacked donative intent must
stand, in that Appellant has not met its burden to marshal evidence
favorable to this finding.
POINT III
The District Court's award of attorney's fees below was
not made upon a finding of need, but was rather assessed based upon
Roger's lack of cooperation.

The trial court is in a unique

position to evaluate the reasonableness of fees and the equities
surrounding the assessment thereof.

No abuse of discretion has

been shown, as the award is supported by the evidence and the
findings below, and should be affirmed.
POINT IV
The manner in which the District Court conducted the
trial resulted in ci fair trial.
basis

of

her

claim

nor

how

Arvilla has not articulated the
the

property

distribution

was

inequitable. Allegations of "a sleeping judge" are unfounded, and
are refuted in an examination of the proceedings. The division of
smaller items of personal property was achieved by stipulation and
therefore may not be challenged on appeal.
POINT V
Since the $500.00 attorney fee award below was assessed
against Roger on the basis of his lack of cooperation prior to
6

trial, rather than need or ability to pay, previous decisions of
this Court regarding award of fees on appeal are inapplicable.
Arvilla has not alleged a change in circumstances since trial, and
neither party should be awarded fees or costs on appeal.
ROGER'S CROSS-APPEAL:
POINT I
The District Court abused its discretion in failing to
treat the "Rent Note" in the same equitable manner that it treated
the "Hallmark Note."

Both parties received significant benefit

from this debt, as well as from the loan to open the Hallmark
store, even though the "Rent Note" did not result in the creation
of a tangible marital asset.

It was rather a family expense and

should have been held chargeable against marital assets.
ruling resulted in manifest inequity to Roger.

This

The District

Court's holding that the "Rent Note" alone was subject to the legal
defense of statute of limitations was a misapplication of law which
requires reversal and remand on this issue.
ARGUMENT
[BRIEF OF APPELLEE]
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN ORDERING PAYMENT OF THE
"HALLMARK NOTE" WITH JOINT MARITAL FUNDS
In Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992), this
Court recently summarized the standard by which the trial court's
property and debt division will be reviewed on appeal.

"There is

no fixed formula upon which to determine a division of properties
7

in a divorce actionL.J" [Citing Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P. 2d 1144,
1146 (Utah App. 1988)].

"We afford the trial court considerable

latitude in adjusting financial and property interests, and its
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity."
added, citations omitted) .

Id. (emphasis

"Additionally, we have held that in

dividing property between the parties in a divorce action, the
overriding

consideration

equitable."

is

that

the

ultimate

division

be

Watson, supra, 837 P.2d 1, 6; (citations omitted).

Thus the appellant must show that the trial court committed a
"clear abuse of discretion" to prevail on this issue on before this
Court.

Id.
An examination of the evidence before the District Court

reveals that equity compelled a holding that the "Hallmark Note"
was chargeable against joint marital assets.

The funds loaned to

Roger by his parents were the subject of a written note (R. 580582) . Arvilla clearly knew of this obligation, and spoke about it
on several occasions with Roger, and with Roger's mother Mina
Finlayson, the sole surviving obligee on the note (R. 487, 488,
495) .

Arvilla encouraged repayment on the parental obligations

repeatedly throughout the last three years of the marriage (R.
496) .
In addition to Arvilla's knowledge of and repeated
urging

to repay the obligation, because the parties1

reaped

substantial benefit from the loan, equity requires that the parties
jointly repay the underlying obligation which created that asset.
The evidence at trial showed that a substantial portion of the
8

marital estate was obtained from the sale of the Hallmark store.
Both parties acknowledge that the proceeds of that sale paid off
the mortgage on their home (R. 499, 593), and that the proceeds
also provided them with their living expenses in the last three
years of the marriage (R. 439). The District Court found that ".
. .without this loan from [Roger's] parents, the parties would not
have had the opportunity to engage in and build the business and
reap its benefits."

Finding of Fact 13, at R. 157. This finding

is supported by Roger's testimony at R. 594.
Conversely, it appears that if the District Court had
ruled otherwise, i.e., that this substantial and tangible benefit
to both parties, which resulted in the primary asset of the marital
estate, had not been subject to repayment of the underlying
obligation, an inequitable result would surely have occurred. Such
a holding, a result which Arvilla now urges this Court to adopt,
would have allowed Arvilla to enjoy the full benefit of her share
of the asset, while leaving all of its attendant burden to Roger.
Fundamental principals of fairness are mocked by such a result.
Those who mutually benefit from an asset should be required, in
equity, to share in its attendant burdens.
In addressing Arvilla's arguments that the "Hallmark
Note" should not be chargeable against the marital estate, all
three "defenses" to the Note are based upon a faulty premise that
this informal but bona fide debt between close relatives (in this
case, parents and child) should be judged in the same as context as
a commercial transaction.

This is obviously an inapt analogy.
9

This Court should focus, as the District Court did, on whether the
debt was real or illusory, the undisputed benefit of the loan to
the marital estate, and the intent of all parties. Such an inquiry
reveals the soundness of the District Court's ruling.
The Brief of Appellant places much reliance on the
assertion that the note was subject to a legal defense of the
statute of limitations. It apparently ignores the fundamental
holdings of Naranio and Watson that this action is one in equity,
not law, and that this purely legal defense is not properly
interposed in the present action.
This Court has previously

sanctioned

the

distribution made by the District Court in this case.

type

of

In Rasband

v. Rasband. 752 P. 2d 1331, 1335, (Utah App. 1988), this court
affirmed a set off of marital debts against an awarded marital
asset, finding no abuse of discretion.
Arvilla's reliance upon the doctrines of laches and
estoppel are likewise misplaced, but for different reasons. As to
laches, the facts of this case show that the existence of the debt
was discussed by all relevant parties years before the divorce.
Arvilla even stated to Roger at one point "Well, how much do WE owe
your mother."

(R. 432, emphasis added).

She repeatedly encouraged

Roger to repay the debt (R. 496) .
Arvilla cites the case of Plateau Min. v. Utah Division
of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990), a contract case, in
support of her claim of laches. The Court did not invoke laches
therein because the party seeking to invoke the doctrine had
10

defaulted in its contractual obligation. As the Finlayson accounts
were jointly controlled by the parties, and each of them made
withdrawals from the accounts (R. 434, Finding of Fact 9 at R.
154), Arvilla could have paid the debt herself.

Since Arvilla

clearly perceived the debt as joint, but did nothing, she may not
now attribute the failure to pay solely to Roger.

Her inaction

places her in pari delicto with Roger.
Arvillafs reliance on the doctrine of estoppel not only
fails in elemental proof, but is contrary to the evidence at trial.
Arvilla must show that her inaction or action was reasonably
induced by the parents failure to pursue the debt.

She has not

articulated what she did, did not do, nor could have done in
"reliance" on the parent's "inaction."

Thus, estoppel is not

shown.
In summary Arvilla's three "defenses" were articulated
and rejected below.

The uncontroverted evidence clearly shows

Arvilla know of the debt, encouraged repayment, and finally got her
stated desire.

These facts standing alone vitiate all "defenses"

she now seeks to interpose.
The District Court heard Mina Finlayson testify that she
did not demand repayment because Roger and Arvilla were having
financial difficulty.

Arvilla now urges this Court to substitute

its judgment for that of the trial Judge who heard this evidence,
and hold that a motherfs forbearance out of compassion for her son
and daughter-in-law should bar recovery on a debt that was commonly
and repeatedly discussed, acknowledged, and ultimately repaid at
11

Arvilla's request. Such a result would be manifestly inequitable,
and the District Court's action should be affirmed.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING THAT THE VACANT
LOT ADJACENT TO THE MARITAL RESIDENCE WAS
NOT WITHIN THE MARITAL ESTATE IS SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND IS NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS
In asking this Court to set aside the findings of the
District Court relative to inclusion of property within the marital
estate, the appellant must first "marshal all evidence in support
of the trial court's finding and then demonstrate that, even
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings,
the evidence is insufficient to support the findings.

Watson v.

Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 6 (Utah App. 1992) (emphasis added), quoting
Scharf v. BMG Corp,, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah, 1985).

The Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure preclude setting aside the trial court's
findings unless they are clearly erroneous, with the caveat that ".
. .due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses."

U.R.Civ.P. 52(a).

The Appellant's brief clearly fails to marshal the
supportive evidence in a meager three paragraphs, but instead but
uses several citations to the record in an attempt to attack the
District Court's findings. As this Court held in the Watson case,
given Appellant's failure to meet that burden to marshal, this
Court should "assume the record supports the finding, Crouse v.
Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991), and conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion. . ." Watson, 837 P.2d
12

at 4. The District Court's findings should therefore be affirmed,
solely upon Appellant's failure to marshal.
Additionally, Appellant's Brief contains an incorrect
statement in its citation to the record below in its purported
"marshalling" section.
16.

It asserts at page 26 thereof that:

The fact that Roger was the sole surviving child of his
mother. (R-716) [sic]

The Record at page 716 establishes no such sole survivorship, and
in fact does not address this issue.

The existence of another

surviving sibling to Roger is indeed established at R. 556, line
17-23.

Counsel merely seeks at this juncture to rectify this

misperception of the record and the actual facts.
While failure to marshal is fatal to Wife's argument
herein, and the District Court's finding should be affirmed on that
basis alone, the record yields abundant evidence upon which the
District Court made its findings.
In its ruling from the bench after trial, the District
Court found that a vacant lot next to the former marital home,
while nominally titled jointly in the names of the parties, was not
within the marital estate. This ruling was embodied in the Court's
oral pronouncement (R. 327) and written Findings of Fact that Mina
Finlayson's 1978 transfer of title was not made with donative
intent, but was deeded to the parties merely as trustees for
maintenance and sale of the property.
155-156.

Finding of Fact 12, at R.

Both findings are supported by substantial evidence in

the record below:

13

Mina Finlayson testified that she believed she still
owned the lot at the time of trial (R. 552).
Mina and her husband bought the lot decades ago to build
on but the husband died prior to building (R. 550-551) .
Mina decided to sell the lot when her husband died, and
asked her son Roger to maintain and sell the lot for her
(R. 552) •
Mina asked her lawyer to take care of the details of
authorizing Roger to sell the lot (R. 553).
Mina did not understand that the property had been
transferred jointly to Roger and Arvilla (R. 563) .
Mina's intent at the time of transfer was so that Roger
could "sell it for me" (R. 562).
Mina never intended to gift the lot to Roger and/or
Arvilla (R. 555).
Roger testified that at the time of the transfer Mina
wanted him to maintain and sell the property for her,
that Mina never said she was giving the property to him,
and that he gave nothing in exchange for the property
(R. 650).
Kurt Finlayson, an adult child of the parties, testified
that the lot was referred to as "grandmothers" (R. 570) ,
and that he understood that to mean Mina Finlayson
(R.571).
Roger and Kurt both testified that when an offer was
received on the property, Roger personally conveyed the
14

offer to Mina, and she rejected it as too low (R. 570,
651).

After the transfer of title Roger's sole intent

was to maintain and sell the lot on behalf of his mother
(R. 652).
11.

Mina was ninety-two years old at the time of trial (R.
534) .
The above summarized evidence at trial clearly support

the District Courtfs findings that the vacant lot was not conveyed
by Mina with donative intent, and was therefore not within the
marital estate. The only evidence contrary to these findings came
from Arvilla herself.

After hearing all of the evidence on this

issue, the District Court obviously chose to accept the testimony
of Mina, Roger and Kurt, and disregard the limited testimony of
Arvilla.
Given Appellant's failure to marshal, and the abundant
evidence supporting the District Court's finding, said finding must
remain undisturbed.
POINT III
THE
DISTRICT
COURT'S
ASSESSMENT
ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD BE AFFIRMED

OF

A trial court has the power to award attorney fees in
divorce proceedings, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3.

The

decision to make such an award and the amount thereof rests
primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. However the
award must be based on evidence of both financial need and
reasonableness. Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah App.
1988) (citations omitted).

Awards will be reversed only if they
15

constitute an abuse of discretion, or if the award is not supported
by adequate findings. Id. at 1336; Bell v. Bell, 810 P. 2d 489, 494
(Utah App. 1991).
The District Court specifically rejected requests for
the award of attorney's fees based upon need.

This ruling is

soundly based in the evidence at trial. The Court found that Roger
was then unemployed and that Arvilla had part-time employment
(Finding of Fact 6 at R. 151). At trial Arvilla admitted making a
$19,000.00 cash loan to her son at the outset of the divorce (R.
435, 503), and to taking a trip to Hawaii during the course of the
proceedings (R. 503).

The record is replete with references to

additional and substantial assets owned by the parties, including
the unencumbered marital home.
In its pronouncement of ruling, the Court found that
each party had assets and recourse to pay their own attorneys (R.
351).

Thus the Court rejected need-based awards of attorney's

fees.
The Court went on in its pronouncement of ruling to
order Roger to pay $500.00 in Arvilla's attorney's fees. The Court
assessed this amount based upon Roger's lack of cooperation prior
to trial.

While Appellant contends in its Brief at page 29 that

Roger admitted only he had been "hard headed,"

a review of

Appellant's citation of the transcript reveals Roger thought both
parties had been hard headed.
In its ruling, the Court obviously
demeanor

of both parties, the presentations
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considered the
of counsel, and

assessed compensatory attorney's fees based upon the vigorously
contested proceedings before it. It should be noted that Arvilla's
requests for citation of contempt were denied by the Court.

The

trial court is in a unique position to evaluate which fees are
reasonable and necessary, and assess any such amounts in its sound
discretion.
In deference to the District Court's determinations
after trial, and evidence of substantial assets of both parties,
the award of attorney's fees should be affirmed.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE CONDUCTED IN A
MANNER WHICH RESULTED IN A FAIR TRIAL AS TO
ALL PARTIES, AND WERE NOT ARBITRARY
Arvilla claims that the trial proceedings as conducted
by Senior Judge Wahlquist denied her a fair trial.

Among her

allegations are that the Judge was sleeping, that he acted in an
arbitrary manner, and that he was flippant about dividing up
thousands of pieces of minor personal items. Roger concedes that
the monumental task of dividing thousands of items with nominal
value may have

frustrated

the Court.

These assertions are

insufficient to warrant either a reversal or new trial.
Initially,

these

arguments

suffer

from

the

same

infirmity noted by this Court's unanimous opinion, per Judge
Billings in Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991).

In

that case, the wife claimed that the trial court failed to
accurately account for and value the marital property and that
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therefore

the

court's property

distribution

was

inequitable.

Accordingly this Court held there, as it should in this case:
Wife does not articulate the basis of her
claim that the court's property distribution
was inequitable. She does not explain what
property she believes should have been
awarded to her or how the court abused its
discretion.
Therefore, we affirm the
property distribution. Id.
These purported deficiencies weire raised in Arvilla's
motion for new trial, which was denied by Memorandum Decision of
Judge Wahlquist (drafted by the Court itself) and entered May 19,
1992

(R.

288-297).

Appellant's

Brief

The Memorandum
at

A-55

through

Decision, reproduced
A-64,

is

articulate

in
and

demonstrates that the Court understood the issues and testimony at
trial, and provides insight on the Court's attentive nature.

As

the Memorandum Decision was authored almost seven months after the
trial, Judge Wahlquist may have been off on some details, but
clearly demonstrates his grasp of the proceedings.
Judge Wahlquist also pronounced his ruling immediately
from the bench after trial. A copy of that transcript appears at
Brief of Appellant Appendix A-l through A-33. The Court ruled on
every issue before it, appeared lucid, clarified its ruling at
counsels' request, and finally asked if further issues remained
undisposed of, to which the parties both replied in the negative.
No credible evidence exists in the record that Judge Wahlquist
slept through this trial, and all appearances are that he did not.
Arvilla challenges the division of personal property as
arbitrary and capricious.

The record below indicates that Judge
18

Wahlquist assigned values and awarded each of the parties numerous
items with substantial value.

Arvilla does not claim that these

values are without foundation in the record, but rather that when
it got down to thousands of smaller items, Judge Wahlquist's
suggestion of division by alternate choice beginning with a coin
toss was improper.

It should be noted that no such coin toss took

place during the trial, in that the Court took a recess after which
the parties

agreed

to meet at the residence

and

divide by

stipulation (R. 338).
The record after trial indicates minor personal property
was in fact divided by agreement.

In post trial proceedings,

Arvilla filed an Affidavit, (reproduced in its entirety in the
Appendix hereto, and found at R. 232-239A), which details the
division by agreement that took place in November of 1991.

It

specifically references alternate choice by the parties, and was
sanctioned by attorneys for both Arvilla and Roger, who were
present for the division (R. 235-236).

As such, Arvilla has no

basis upon which to challenge this purported impropriety.

Thus,

even if the District Court deportment is deemed inappropriate, no
prejudicial error resulted.
POINT V
NEITHER PARTY SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S
FEES NOR COSTS ON APPEAL, IN THAT THE
DISTRICT COURT DID NOT BASE THE $500 AWARD
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES BELOW BASED UPON A
FINDING OF NEED
As discussed above, the District Court did not award
attorney's fees below on a basis of need, but rather upon the
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conclusion that Rocjer had not been cooperative prior to trial.
Since those considerations are not at play in the instant appeal,
they do not constitute a basis for award of attorney's fees on
appeal.

Thus, Appellant's reliance on Crouse v. Crouse in its

brief is misplaced.
No allegation is made that the appeals nor defense of
those appeals are frivolous. To the contrary, it appears that the
parties have a substantial and bona fide dispute as to the judgment
of the District Court.
Arvilla has not put forth any allegation that the
financial circumstances of the parties have changed since the trial
of this matter.

Based upon the findings of the District Court,

this Court should not award either party their costs nor attorney's
fees on appeal.
ARGUMENT
[BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT]
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO ORDER REPAYMENT OF THE "RENT
NOTE" FROM JOINT MARITAL FUNDS
As more fully set forth in Point I of the Brief of
Appellee above, the standard for appellate review of the District
Court's ruling on issues of property and debt distribution of the
marital estate is one of abuse of discretion.
Court

is

afforded

considerable

latitude

While the District
in

adjusting

these

interests, and its actions enjoy a presumption of validity, this
Court may set aside such determinations if it can be shown that
there was a misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and
20

prejudicial error, or if such a serious inequity has resulted as to
manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d
1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988) cited with approval in Watson v.
Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah App. 1992).

In this cross-appeal,

Roger Finlayson contends that just such a serious inequity has
resulted by the District Court's refusal to order repayment of the
"Rent Note" with joint marital funds.
Roger asserts that the District Court treated the
"Hallmark Note" in an equitable manner by ordering its repayment
with joint marital funds, as detailed in Point I of the Brief of
Appellee, supra.

Roger concedes that such treatment of the

"Hallmark Note" is in a somewhat stronger position due that debt's
creation of a tangible asset, and the "benefits/burdens" analysis
set forth therein.

Roger now argues that even though the "Rent

Note" created no tangible marital asset, it too should have been
ordered repaid with joint marital funds. The basis herefor is that
the

underlying

expenditure

was

clearly

a

family

necessity

expenditure (housing) , was within Arvilla's knowledge, and was also
the subject of repeated discussions of repayment.
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-9 support
Roger's contention that the "Rent Note" is chargeable against the
marital estate.

It provides:

Family expenses
liability.

—

Joint

and

several

The expenses of the family and the education
of the children are chargeable upon the
property of both husband and wife or of
either of them, and in relation thereto they
may be sued jointly or separately.
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As housing is clearly a family expense, the plain language of this
statute requires that the "Rent Note", once determined to be bona
fide, is chargeable against the marital estate.
As set forth above, in Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d
1331, 1335, (Utah App. 1988), this Court affirmed a set off of
marital debts against an awarded asset, finding no abuse of
discretion. Having established that such a process of equalization
is permissible, Roger argues that the "Rent Note" should have been
treated in the same manner as the "Hallmark Note."
The testimony at trial makes little differentiation as
to the two Notes, but references are largely to the "debt" alone.
It is undisputed that Arvilla and Roger obtained joint value
(housing) under the obligation. Apparently the District Court also
found the "Rent Note" to be bona fide in both its pronouncement of
ruling (R. 328) and Finding of Fact #13 at R. 158. The Court ruled
that this Note was not chargeable to the assets of the marital
estate under alternative doctrines of Statute of Limitation,
estoppel, and waiver.

Roger argues that such a ruling is a

misapplication of law, and constitutes an abuse of the trial
court's discretion.
As set forth above, the legal bar of the statute of
limitations is inapplicable in this case of equity.

There is

further evidence of novation and extension in the record below.
Estoppel is also not at play due to Arvilla's admitted knowledge of
the debt to Roger's parents, her adoption of them as joint debts,
and her encouragements to repay.
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In short, there appears no substantial reason to treat
the "Hallmark Note1 and the "Rent Note" in a different manner, as
equity requires consistency of treatment.

At no time did Arvilla

assert that she believed that the parties resided in the parents'
rental property for free.

It is undisputed that both parties

received substantial benefit from Roger's parents, in a time of
great need.

In equity, both should

be ordered

to equally

contribute to discharge this debt from joint marital assets.
Due to its disparate treatment of these two acknowledged
bona fide debts, which each imparted joint benefit to the parties,
the ruling of the District Court as to the "Rent Note" should be
reversed as an abuse of its discretion.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The District properly held the "Hallmark Note" to be
chargeable against the assets of the marital estate, but abused its
discretion in refusing to treat the "Rental Note" in the same
manner.

The District Court's finding that the vacant lot was not

within the marital estate is clearly supported by the evidence at
trial.

The personal property distribution was equitable, and

appears to have been achieved in part by the Judge's valuations and
awards, and further by stipulated division.

The District Court's

award of attorney's fees is not an abuse of discretion because both
parties had financial resources, and each had large attorney's
fees.
appeal.

As such, no costs or attorney's fees should be awarded on
The District Court did abuse its discretion in failing to

charge the "Rent Note" against marital assets.
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Accordingly, Roger Finlayson seeks the following relief
on appeal:
1.

Affirmance of the District Court's ruling that the

"Hallmark Note" should be paid with joint marital funds, in that
the same was not an abuse of discretion.
2.

Leaving undisturbed the District Court's finding

that the vacant lot adjacent to the former marital home was not
within the marital estate, as said finding is fully supported by
the evidence.
3.

Affirmance

of the District

Court's

award

of

attorney's fees below, and further ordering that each party bear
their costs and fees incurred on appeal.
4.

An order vacating the District Court's ruling that

the "Rent Note" was not a joint debt properly chargeable against
the marital assets, as an abuse of its discretion, and directing
the District Court on remand to enter judgment in favor of Roger
and against Arvilla for one-half of the total principal amount of
$2,280.00 (plus simple interest at 6%) due Mina Finlayson on the
"Rent Note."

/

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this V

day of February, 1993.

WILLIAM R. RUSSELL
Attorney for Roger Finlayson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the Of
U

day of February,

1993, I served the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND BRIEF OF CROSSAPPELLANT (Consolidated) by mailing 2 copies thereof to:
SHARON A. DONOVAN, ESQ.
KENT M. KASTING, ESQ.
SHANNON W. CLARK, ESQ.
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
310 South Main, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901)
SHANNON W. CLARK (5678)
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
310 South Main Street, Suite 1330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167
Telephone: (801) 521-63 83
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
oOo
ARVILLA FINLAYSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

:
:
:

ROGER FINLAYSON,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF'S COUNTER AFFIDAVIT

Civil No. D90-5062

:
:

Honorable Timothy R. Hansen

oOo
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Arvilla Finlayson, after being
first duly sworn upon oath, and deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled matter.

2.

I have personal knowledge concerning the facts and

circumstances surrounding the matters set forth below.
3.

In response to Paragraph 3 of Defendant's Affidavit,

when I first initiated this divorce, in December, 1990, I was
forced to seek the assistance of the Court in having defendant
removed from the home because he had been loading up our marital

property and secreting it away. Defendant did have the opportunity
to say goodbye to his daughter and, in fact, went to her school and
told her that I was going to send her father to jail.
4.

In response to Paragraph 5 of Defendant's Affidavit,

On February 1, 1991, both defendant and I and both our attorneys
were present at the marital residence.

Up until that time, I had

been living in the home and had been ordered to allow defendant and
Trisha to move back into the home February 2nd or 3rd, 1991. When
all parties and attorneys were present, I had moved all of my
personal belongings and minimal items to set up housekeeping into
the center of the living room and in the family room so defendant
could observe the items I was removing. I had also inventoried all
significant items of property in the entire home. On February 1st,
all parties and attorneys had the opportunity to review and approve
my inventory lists as well as every item of property I was planning
to remove to set up an apartment.
the home.

I removed no sealed boxes from

In fact, both my attorney and defendant's attorney

assisted me in removing the items from the home and into the
driveway on February 1, 1991.

Since that day, I have not removed

any items of property except for those that have been specifically
divided and agreed upon between defendant and I.
5.

In response to Paragraph 6 of Defendant's Affidavit,

when I turned over the marital residence to defendant in February,
1991, there were no items of property broken or destroyed.

I see

no reference to any broken items on defendant's property list.
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6.

In response to Paragraph 7 or Defendant's Affidavit*,

I categorically deny that I have hidden any marital property or
taken any items without prior agreement or approval.

I have been

forthright and honest in my actions and dealing with defendant
throughout the divorce.
7.

In response to Paragraph 8 of Defendant's Affidavit,

it is true that with attorneys present we divided many of the
larger items of personal property.

It was then necessary for

defendant and I alone to divide the remainder of the smaller items.
I never redivided what had already been designated as defendant's.
It has been necessary to continue to set up times to divide the
property due to defendant's inability to work on the division for
longer than several hours at a time.
8.

In response to Paragraph 9 of Defendant's Affidavit,

I understood that I was to begin paying child support in January,
1992.

I have paid $102.50 for January, February and March for a

total of $307.50.
9.

In

response

to

Paragraph

10

of

Defendant's

Affidavit, I agree to entering into an agreement to pay one-half of
the cost of counseling.

The Court ordered we share the cost, and

I have been the one trying to set up such counseling.
10.
Affidavit,
Liquidator.

I

In
have

response
not

to

Paragraph

received

any

11

of

checks

for

Defendant's
the

Thrift

I have provided a copy of the total amount to be

divided to defendant's counsel.

It is my understanding that this

amount is to be divided in July, 1992. Attached as Exhibit "A" is
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a copy of a disbursement from Thrift Liquidation that defendant
has, to this day, not divided nor acknowledged.

I only have notice

of this check directly through the liquidators.
11.

In

response

to

Paragraph

12,

of

Defendant's

Affidavit, I have been paying rent for the past year and defendant
has been living in the home without making any monthly payment. It
is only fair and reasonable that he be ordered to pay the tax and
insurance for the year he resided in the residence.

I earn $5.42

per hour for a monthly net of approximately $325.15 minus my child
support obligation of $102.50 for a total of $222.65 to meet my
monthly living expenses.

In addition, I am attending Salt Lake

Community College full time.

Clearly, I have no monies to pay

taxes, insurance, or repairs on the residence. Defendant complains
of lack of resources to make repairs, however, he has not even made
the simplest, most minor repairs.

In addition, he has had the

resources to obtain new furniture in the home to replace the items
I was awarded.

For example, defendant has obtained two reclining

chairs in the front room and some furniture for Trisha.
12.

In response to defendant's list of items "missing

from the house11, the following are just examples of my responses to
some of the items on defendant's list:
a.

The motor home was basically cleaned out by the

time defendant and I began dividing the property in November, 1991,
after the divorce trial. I had not been in the motor home for over
eight months when I discovered the numerous items missing out of
the motor home.
4
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b.

The sewing machine cabinet was mine prior tfb

marriage and I have it in my possession.
c.

The oriental rug was divided when the parties

and attorneys were present in November, 1991, and I received the
rug

and

Exhibit

defendant

ft lf

B ,

received

the

freezer

in

exchange.

(See

which is plaintifffs attorney, Shannon W. Clark's

notes taken on November 27, 1991, regarding the division of
personal property.
the

lf ff

R

The "A" notes that plaintiff selected the item

notes that defendant selected the item.

As the notes

reflect, Roger had selected the Rug and Arvilla had selected the
Freezer, then the parties made a switch.)
d.

The keyboard was also divided when attorneys

and parties were present in November, 1991.
e.

The canister vacuum

(See Exhibit "B") .

listed was awarded to

plaintiff in exchange for the upright that defendant had in his
possession.
f.

During

the

division

in November,

specifically asked defendant where the chain saw was.

1991, I

He replied

that Kurt must have borrowed it.
q.

Regarding the tool box, when I moved out of the

house in February, 1991, defendant agreed, upon the advice of his
attorney, to allow me to have the small ammunition box of tools
that was taken out of the motor home so that I could set up an
apartment.
13.

In response to Paragraph 4 of Defendant's Counter

Affidavit, I refused to re-sign the listing agreement with Eager
5

00

because they had indicated to me that defendant was not cooperating
in the sale and then later indicated they were unwilling to
document defendant's actions to frustrate the sale because they did
not want to further anger or alienate defendant.

Eager was also

unwilling to move the "For Sale" sign to a more visible location.
14.

In response to paragraph 6 of Defendant's Counter

Affidavit, during the marriage we kept all our important documents
in the family safe. I was never allowed to have the combination to
the safe.

When the attorneys and defendant and I inventoried the

home in February, 1991, the safe was empty.

I believe defendant

removed these documents just prior to my filing for divorce.
have never removed any of these documents.

I

I never had access to

them.
15.

In response to paragraph 9 of

Defendant1 Counter

Affidavit, after I left the marital residence in February, 1991,
defendant had sole use and possession of the motor home.

In fact,

he took several trips in it in the spring and summer of 1991.

I

offered to sell the motor home to defendant after the divorce trial
and he said "No".

As far as I am aware, defendant has not filed

any type of police report of claim on insurance for the damage to
the vehicle. Our son, Kurt, informed me that Trisha told him that
she observed defendant putting sugar in the motor home gas tank.
I deny I was in any way involved in the damage to the vehicle.

I

had the motor home removed from the residence in mid-March to have
it repaired and sold.

Defendant should be responsible for the

cost of the motor home repair.
6
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DATED this 7

day of April, 1992

ARVILLA FINLA

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary
Public, this (-]'

day of April, 1992
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NOTARY
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L I IRENE
Notary
M.CLARK
Public
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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correct
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